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CoNTRACTs-CoNSIDERATION-EFFECT oF OPTION To WITHDRAW GoVERN-
MENT SURPLUS PROPERTY FROM SALE-The Office of Surplus Property ac-
cepted defendant's bid for a quantity of sodium carbonate. Submitted on the 
appropriate government form, the bid was subject to a condition which gave 
the government " • . . the right to withdraw from sale any property prior to 
the removal thereof without incurring any liability except to refund to the 
purchaser any amount paid with respect to the said property." Although the 
sodium carbonate had not been withdravvn from sale, the defendant refused 
to perform his promise to buy it. The government brought an action for 
damages, and the defense was that no contract e.'aSted because there was no 
mutuality of obligation. Held, the contention that the contract lacked mutuality 
was without merit. United States 11. Weisbrod, (7th Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 
629. 
Although the opinion in the principal case contains the suggestion that 
contracts for the disposal of surplus defense property by the government present 
an atypical situation,1 the defendant's liability is assumed for the purpose of 
this note to have been based solely on the conclusion that there was mutuality 
of obligation. "Mutuality of obligation" is a misleading way of referring to 
the need for enforceable promises as consideration in the usual bilateral con-
tract.2 illusory promises do not curtail the promisor's freedom of action and 
for that reason cannot be enforced; they therefore do not constitute con-
sideration.3 If the promise of one of the parties to a bilateral contract is 
illusory, the contract lacks mutuality of obligation because both parties are 
1 Principal case at 632. 
2 Gms~10RB, CoNTRACTS §68 (1947); 1 CoRBm, CONTRACTS §152 (1950); 1 Wn.-
LISTON, CoNTitACTS, rev. ed., §141 (1936). 
3 See Corbin, "The Effect of Options on Considetation," 34 Y.AI:B L.J. 571 (1925). 
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not bound by enforceable promises. Thus if A promises to sell a bushel of 
apples to B unless he changes his mind, A really has promised nothing; he 
can change his mind at any time and for any reason.4 The same result obtains 
if B promises to buy an unspecified quantity of apples from A.5 The promise 
is not illusory, however, if the exercise of :A's option to change his mind is 
dependent upon the happening of some event over which he does not have 
complete control.6 For e.'i:ample, if A promises to sell B a bushel of apples 
unless his car is struck by lightning, A's freedom of action is limited and his 
promise is enforceable; A must sell the apples unless lightning strikes his car. 
Nor is a promise illusory if A gives something of value for the option of 
changing his mind:7 if A pays or promises to pay twenty-five cents for the 
option of deciding whether or not to sell B the bushel of apples which B has 
promised to buy, a contract results. Although an illusory promise does not 
constitute consideration, it is of course not necessary that a promise be equivalent 
in value to the consideration given by the other party in order to form a binding 
bilateral contract.8 A's promise to give Ba piece of paper would be consideration 
for B's promise to buy one bushel of apples.9 A fortiori, A's promise either 
to sell the apples to B or, in the alternative, to give B a piece of paper con-
taining notice of an election to exercise his option not to sell would constitute 
consideration. Accordingly, a contract is formed if B promises to buy the 
apples and if A combines a promise to sell unless he changes his mind with 
a promise to notify B of his change of mind.10 The consideration is even more 
evident when A's promise to notify B must be performed within a stated period 
4American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. Kennedy and Crawford, 103 Va. 171, 48 
S.E. 868 (1904). See R. F. Baker Co. v. Ballentine and Sons, 127 Conn. 680, 20 A. 
(2d) 82 (1941); Bendix Home Appliances, Inc. v. Radio Accessories Co., (8th Cir. 1942) 
129 F. (2d) 177; 1 CoNrnACTs REsTATEMJlNT §79, comment b, illus. 1 (1932); 137 
A.L.R. 919 (1942). 
:; Willard, Sutherland and Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 489, 43 S.Ct. 592 (1923). 
o Hunt v. Stimson, (6th Cir. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 447; Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Gladding, 
(4th Cir. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 440; Central Trust Co. of illinois v. Chicago Auditorium 
Assn., 240 U.S. 581, 36 S.Ct. 412 (1916). 
7Reech v. Caloy Corp., 329 Mich. 453, 45 N.W: (2d) 349 (1951); Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Rau Construction Co., (8th Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 499. Contra, Velie 
l\fotor Car Co. v. Kopmeier Motor Car Co., (7th Cir. 1912) 194 F. 324. 
s Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin, (3d Cir. 1924) l F. (2d) 687. 
o Haigh v. Brooks, IO Ad. & E. 309, 113 Eng. Rep. 119 (1839). 
10 Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., (2d Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 
675; Realty Advertising and Supply Co. v. Englebert Tyre Co., 89 Misc. 371, 151 N.Y.S. 
885 (1915). The result would be the same as if both parties to the contract combined an 
option to cancel with a promise to notify. Fawcett v. Fawcett, 191 N.C. 679, 132 S.E. 796 
(1926); J. R. Watkins v. Rich, 254 Mich. 82, 235 N.W. 845 (1931). Specific perform-
ance in equity, however, ordinarily will not be available when the contract gives one of 
the parties the right to cancel. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange Crush Co., (5th 
Cir. 1924) 296 F. 693 (1924). This is on the theory that since one of the parties can 
cancel the contract at his pleasure, there is no mutuality of remedy. Rust v. Conrad, 47 
Mich. 449, 11 N.W. 265 (1882). Annotation, 22 A.L.R. (2d) 508 (1952). But see 
Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Marsans, (D.C. Mo. 1914) 216 F. 269. 
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of time.11 A's promise to sell to B unless he changes his mind combined with 
a promise to sell the apples to no one other than B likewise limits his freedom 
of action and therefore satisfies the consideration requirement.12 
The results indicated above seem clear when the promises are stated ex-
pressly in the contract. When they are not express, however, the courts some-
times will £nd that they are implied. Although the decisions are by no means 
uniform, the proper circumstances for such an implication seem to be where 
(1) the parties intended to obligate themselves by an enforceable agreement, 
and (2) they intended the implied promise to be a part of their contract.13 
In the situation presented by the principal case, consideration could be found 
to exist in an implied promise to give notice of an election to withdraw the 
sodium carbonate from sale.14 The same result could be reached by £nding an 
implied promise to sell to no one other than to the promisee;16 this seems 
especially plausible since the terms of the contract required the government 
to withdraw the sodium carbonate from sale if it decided not to sell it to the 
defendant. A legal detriment also could be found in the fact that the 
government's option to withdraw had to be exercised before the defendant's 
removal of the property.16 Since the parties probably intended to be bound 
when they entered into the agreement and since the seller's option to with-
draw was a part of the bargained-for consideration,17 the court's decision can 
be justified on both authority and principle. 
Arthur M. Wisehart, S.Ed. 
11 Realty Advertising and Supply Co. v. Englebert Tyre Co., note 10 supra; Phalanx 
Air Freight, Inc. v. National Skyway Freight Coi:p., 104 Cal. App. (2d) 771, 232 P. (2d) 
510 (1951). 
12Brodsky v. George H. Mom! Co., 237 Mass. 86, 129 N.E. 359 (1921). 
1s Sylvan Crest Sand and Gravel Co. v. United States, (2d Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 
642. 
14 Sylvan Crest Sand and G:ravel Co. v. United States, note 13 supra; Gurfein v. 
Werbelovsky, 97 Conn. 703, 118 A. 32 (1922). . 
15 Burgess Sulphite Fibre Co. v. Philip Broomfield, 180 Mass. 283, 62 N.E. 367 
(1902); 1 WILI.IsToN, CoNTRAars, rev. ed., §104 (1936). Contra, Midland Steel Sales 
Co. v. Waterloo Gasoline Engine Co., (8th Cir. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 250. 
10 Gurfein v. Werbelovsky, note 14 supra; North and Judd Mfg. Co. v. United States, 
(Ct. Cl. 1949) 84 F. Supp. 649. . 
11 See McCoy v. Pastorius, 125 Colo. 574, 246 P. (2d) 611 (1952). 
